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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH. 
vs. 
LAVELL ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
Case No. 
11191 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST A TEMENT OF THE NATURE 00• THE CASE 
The appellant, Lavell Robinson, appeals from a conviction 
for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor rendered 
by the Honorable Judge Leonard W. Elton in the Third Dist-
rict Court for Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found the appellant guilty of driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the Third Ju-
dicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County should be 
affirmed. 
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ST A TEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was arrested for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The officer explained to the 
appellant that the appellant had the right to three chemical 
te~ts, which are blood, breath and urine, but he did have the 
right to refuse these tests, but upon refusal, he may lose his 
driving privileges for one year. The appellant consented to take 
the breath test (R.12), which was administered and the results 
were admitted into evidence by the lower "Court. 
The appellant was tried before a Justice of the Peace and 
found guilty. He appealed to the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for ~alt Lake County, State of Utah. The District Court 
also found the defendant guilty of driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS 
FINAL ON ALL MA TIERS DECIDED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT EXCEPT \WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTE 
INVOLVED IN THIS CONVICTION IS VALID OR UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In his brief the appellant urges three points on appeal. The 
first point goes to the lack of proper foundation for the ad-
mission of the results of the breathalyzer test. 
The second point goes to the extrapolation of the results 
of the test back to the time of the driving of the atuomobile. 
Neither of these points question the validity or constitutionality 
of the provision of Utah law which denotes the breathalyzer 
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3 
as a test which can be used to determine blood alcohol content , 
nor do these points question the validity or constitutionality of 
the provision of Utah law which provides for the implied con-
sent of any person operating a motor vehicle within this State. 
It is well settled in this State that decisions of a District 
Court in appeals from a Justice of the Peace Court are final 
"except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of 
a statute." Section 9, Article VIII, Utah Constitution; Salt Lake 
City v. Granieri, 16 Utah 2d 245, 398 P.2d 888 (1965) and 
Salt Lake City v. Peters, __ Utah 2d _____ , 449 P.2d 652 
(1969). 
Therefore, the respondent respectfully submits that Points 
I and II of appellant's brief cannot be considered on this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER TO REQUIRE 
THAT PERSONS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE 
UPON TI-IE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS OiF1 THIS ST A TE CON-
SENT TO THE CHEMICAL TESTS TO DETERMINE 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT AND THE PROMULGA-
TION OF THE UT AH STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
It is a fortiori that the State has the power to require that 
drivers be licensed before operating a motor vehicle upon a 
public highway. It is likewise a fortiori that the power thus 
vested in the State carries with it the right to prescribe regu-
lations. The regulations concerning the drivers and their lic-
enses constitutes a valid exercise of the police power to regulate 
the use of highways in the interest of public safety and welfare. 
Sheehan v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 140Cal.App 200, 3 5 
P.2d 361 ( 1934). 
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The Legislature of the State of Utah has enacted Section 
41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). This statute provides 
as follows: 
"(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle 
in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent 
to a chemical test of his breath, blood or urine for the 
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
breath, .... " 
The constitutionality of the foregoing section has been 
raised before the Utah Supreme Court on at least three occas-
ions. Bean v. State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P.2d 750 (1961); 
Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959) and 
Salt Lake City v. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 318, 343 P.2d 1106 
( 19 5 9) . In each of these cases the court stated that it was not 
necessary to consider the validity or constitutionality of this 
statute unle~s it was necessary to the determination of the case. 
For that reawn the constitutionality of this statute has not been 
decided in lJ tah. 
Other states have enacted statutes simaar to Section 41-
6-44, U.C.A. 1953, (as amended). The validity of such statutes 
has been upheld as against the contention that they violate due 
process of law and the guarantee against self-incrimination. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas in Lee v. State, 
187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961) states as follows: 
"The statute does not compel one in plaintiff's 
position to submit to a blood test, and does not re-
quire one to "incriminate himself" within the mean-
ing of constitutional provisions, and neither is it 
violative of due process. It gives the driver the right 
of choice of the statutory suspension of his license, 
and further gives him the right to a hearing on the 
question of the reasonableness of his failure to submit 
to the test.,. 
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The California Supreme Court m People v. Duroncelay, 
312 P.2d 690 (1957) said 
"It is settled by our decision in People c. Haeus-
sler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8, that the admission 
of the evidence did not violate defendant's privilege 
against self incrimination because the privilege relates 
only to testimonial compulsion and not to real evi-
dence. 
The New York Supreme Court in the case of Ballou v. 
Kelly, 12 Misc.2d 178, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1958) upheld a 
similar prov~sion and stated that submission under the circum-
stances provided in the statute seem to the Court a reasonable 
condition precedent to the right to drive upon the highway. 
In rejecting plaintiff's arguments, the court in Prucha v. 
Department of Motor VcMcles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 
88 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1961) said in essence that the implied con-
sent law is that by driving a motor vehicle on the public high-
way the operator consents to the taking of a chemical test to 
determine the alcoholic content of his body fluids. By the act 
of driving his car he has waived his constitutional privilege of 
self-incrimination which has always been considered to be a 
privilege of a solely personal nature which may be waived. 
While not directly in point, the case of Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) held that the admission into evi-
dence of the results of a blood alcohol test taken over the ob-
jection of the driver and his counsel was not a violation of ( 1) 
the person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 
(they reasoned that that right embodied a communication from 
the person to the State or the Court), ( 2) his right to have 
counsel, and ( 3) his Fourth Amendment right to be protected 
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against unreasonable searches and seizure. It would seem ap-
parent from the implication of this decision that not even the 
United States Supreme Court is prepared to hold the right of 
a State to prescribe for the use of the tests to determine the 
blood alcohol content or the implied consent laws such as the 
0:1e in this matter unconstitutional. 
In this case, the requirements of Section 41-6-44.10, U.C. 
A. 1953, as amended, were fully complied with by the officer: 
"It is my policy generally to explain, when I 
place them under arrest, they have the right to three 
chemical tests, which is blood, breath and urine, and 
also that they have the right to refuse these tests. But 
upon refusal, that they have the possibility of losing 
their driver's privileges, or driver's license, for a period 
of one year, upon refusal, and this, and also in dis-
cussing this with Mr. Robinson at my car, he agreed 
to take a breath test which we had available at the 
Redwood Station (T.12). 
Thus, it is clear that the defendant was given his choice of 
rhe chemical tests and is equally clear that the defendant by 
driving his automobile gave his consent to the chemical test. 
le is equally clear under the authorities cited herein that Section 
41-6-44.10, U .C.A. 19 5 3, (as amended), is a valid and consti-
tutional expression by the legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent has restricted his argument to the consti-
tutionality of the Section questioned, as the writer set forth in 
Point I of this brief, there is but that issue before the Court. 
Unless this Court is prepared to rule that the breathalyzer and 
the Section which provides for the use of the breathalyzer is 
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m and of itself unconstitutional, the appellant has no grounds 
for this appeal and the decision of the District Court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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